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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Block-
holdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It
is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a
more concentrated ownership structure. To test for the direction of the effect, we use
a large dataset of U.S. firms that combines blockholder information, shareholder rights
information, debt ratings, accounting information, and financial markets information.
We find that a large fraction of aggregated block ownership negatively affects Tobin’s
Q. The negative impact is larger if blockowners are more dispersed, suggesting that a
concentrated ownership structure is to be preferred on average. Results are robust to
controlling for blockholder type as well as proxies for shareholder rights. Our empirical
findings are also confirmed if we study the impact of ownership dispersion on firm debt
ratings rather than Tobin’s Q.
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1 Introduction
Corporate governance refers to the set of mechanisms that direct and control management
activities within companies. Besides formal (e.g., contracts and legal protection) and in-
formal (e.g., reputation) arrangements, large shareholders or blockholders may also play an
important role in governance structures. Stakeholders may rely on a large blockholder (in-
ternal control), or a potential large instantaneous blockholder (external control) to restrict
management’s discretionary power. Kang and Shivdasani (1995), for example, show that
managers of poorly performing Japanese firms are at greater risk to be replaced in the pres-
ence of large shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that good governance systems
combine some type of large blockholder with legal protection of both majority and minority
shareholder rights.
A critical question is whether the combination of good shareholder rights with the pres-
ence of (several) large shareholders constitutes good governance for all stakeholders. Karpoff,
Malatesta and Walking (1996) indicate that the beneficial impact of shareholder activism
may be modest. In general, large shareholders may have difficulties to cover private costs
associated with the provision of what essentially is a public good (monitoring). This then
leads to a suboptimal level of activism from a social point of view (Shleifer and Vishny
(1986), Admati, Fleiderer and Zechner (1994)). Moreover, shifting the balance of power
towards one of the stakeholders of a company could enlarge agency conflicts among different
stakeholders. Large shareholders might simply try to secure private benefits by misusing
their increased power for preferential self-treatment at the expense of other stakeholders
(LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002)). Empirical estimates by Barclay
and Holderness (1989), Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) confirm the possible
existence of such private benefits of control.
Our main interest here is the impact of concentrated versus dispersed blockholdership on
firm value and perceived debt quality. If blockholder presence produces positive externalities
such as monitoring of management, then a higher concentration of blockholdings allows
shareholders to internalize more of the potential benefits. This provides a larger incentive to
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be actively involved. It also prevents possible free-riding problems in a multiple blockholder
setting (Black (1990)).
Instead of governance through voice, recent studies stress the potential importance of
governance through exit in mitigating agency costs. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Ed-
mans (2009) indicate that prices might better reflect fudamental value as a result of informed
trading by blockholders, inducing management to undertake value-enhancing activities. Ed-
mans and Manso (2009) show that multiple blockholders have a larger, and as a result more
credible incentive to trade ex-post. Dispersed blockholding could therefore be relatively more
effective in terms of governance through exit.
When blockholder presence is negatively related to firm value, Maury and Pajuste (2005)
indicate that the impact of dispersed versus concentrated block ownership is subject to two
countervailing forces. On the one hand, all blockholders can form a coalition, share private
benefits, and in effect act like a single large blockholder. On the other hand, only a subset
of blockholders might be able and willing to extract private benefits, whilst the remaining
blockholders simply try to prevent this through monitoring.
In our analysis, we emphasize the possibility of a third outcome. In a setting with
multiple blockholders, an alternative option is that different blockholders try to pursue their
own objectives independently. This can be due to blockholders being technically unable
in practice to form the coalitions mentioned before. Blockholders may also be unwilling
to enter a coalition if they would be better off when simply not hampering each other’s
attempts to extract private benefits independently. Such uncoordinated actions may be even
more detrimental to company value. This alternative possibility of independent extraction
has not received much attention in the previous literature. Determining its importance
in relation to the other options such as coalition formation or monitoring is an empirical
question, which we take up in the current paper.
Empirical evidence on the effect of multiple blockholders on firm value is limited. Much
of the evidence is also non-U.S. related, see for example Faccio, Lang and Young (2001)
for Western Europe and East Asia, and Volpin (2002) for Italy. Differences in institutional
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settings and the (resulting) differences in ownership structure itself make comparisons across
countries difficult, if not impossible (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999)). Though
majority ownership by a single large blockholder is not common, the U.S. blockholder owner-
ship data reveals that the presence of multiple blockholders, especially outside blockholders,
is a widespread phenomenon (Holderness (2009)).
We contribute to the empirical literature on corporate governance by investigating the
relation between blockholder concentration and firm value. Our final data set consists of
approximately 3,500 U.S. firm year observations from 1996-2001. We proxy for blockholder
concentration by measures related to the Herfindahl index, while controlling for other effects
known from the literature. In all our regressions we use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value.
Our empirical findings reveal a negative relation between blockholding and Tobin’s Q.
A higher fraction of the company’s shares held by blockholders negatively impacts Q. On
top of this, however, the negative relation is more pronounced if the set of blockholders is
more dispersed. The results are robust to a number of variations in the model specification.
Based on the importance of outside blockholders for governance, we also concentrate our
analysis on the dispersion of outside blockholdings only. Again, we find a strong negative
association between outside blockholder dispersion and Q. Controlling for shareholder rights
proxies in the regressions does not change the results. Compromising on shareholder rights
negatively impacts Tobin’s Q. We find some mild evidence of an interaction effect between
(outside) blockholder presence and shareholder rights, which would be in line with LaPorta
et al. (2002). The effect, however, does not drive out the significant negative impact of
blockholder dispersion on Tobin’s Q.
As a final robustness analysis, we investigate the effect of blockholder dispersion on
perceived debt quality. As a proxy for debt quality, we use the firm’s issuer ratings as
assigned by Standard & Poor’s. Standard & Poor’s (2005) claim that governance issues are
regularly examined as part of their credit ratings process. They note that the existence of
more than one owner may lead to conflicts of control. Several other studies have studied the
relation between corporate governance and credit ratings, though none of them explicitly
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looked at blockholder concentration. Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife,
Collins and LaFond (2006) indicate that bond ratings may be positively related to the
percentage of shares held by institutional investors. While Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) find
a negative relation between the percentage of shares held by institutional blockholders and
corporate bond ratings, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find a negative relation between the
number of blockholders and ratings. Our empirical findings confirm that the presence and
percentage of shares held by blockholders is important. However, blockholder concentration
itself is relevant as well. We show that dispersed block ownership is correlated with lower
rating assignments. This is in line with our earlier results on Tobin’s Q.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our set-up and
the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses our empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Theory
The presence of large shareholders can have either a positive or negative effect on firm value.
The shared benefits hypothesis suggests that a large shareholder empowered with sufficient
shareholder rights is beneficial to all of the company’s stakeholders as he mitigates the agency
problem between management and stakeholders as a group. Karpoff et al. (1996), however,
indicate that the beneficial impact of shareholders activism may be modest. The private
benefits hypothesis, by contrast, states that large shareholders can be detrimental to firm
value, see for example Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and references therein. If blockholders
pursue their own objectives, they can expropriate value from other stakeholders, such as
minority shareholders, debt holders, employees, and customers. Thus, the classic agency
problem between management and shareholders is replaced by an agency problem between
powerful blockholders and other stakeholders of the firm (LaPorta et al. (2002)).
Empirical evidence on the possible magnitude of potential private benefits of control
is sparse as private benefit extraction is difficult to measure. Dyck and Zingales (2004)
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measure these benefits using an event study methodology. Their estimates range from -4
percent in Japan to +65 percent in Brazil, while their U.S. estimate equals 2.7 percent. The
large variation in the estimates may reveal that the value of a given block depends on other
factors as well, such as the company’s ownership structure (e.g., number of blockholders)
and the presence or absence of certain governance provisions (i.e., shareholder rights).
We use the framework of LaPorta et al. (2002) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) to study
the possible effects of multiple blockholders on firm value. Let firm value be denoted by
I and assume there are two blockholders. Define α1 as the share in the residual claim
held by blockholder 1. To ensure that value diversion is inefficient, the blockholder bears
a cost c1(s, k, ·)I when a share s is extracted (i.e., the stealing case). This cost explicitly
depends on s and k. The variable k refers to shareholder rights, where larger values of
k represent stronger shareholder rights. We assume c1s > 0 and c1ss > 0, such that it
becomes increasingly more expensive to engage in private benefit extraction. We also assume
c1ks > 0, implying the marginal cost of stealing increases when shareholder rights increase.
This implies that in a situation with good minority shareholder rights it becomes easier for
other shareholders to monitor and discipline a large shareholder.
Besides blockholders interested in private benefit extraction, we allow for a second block-
holder who is possibly not engaged in resource diversion. The second blockholder holds a
share α2 in the residual claim. She has the option to try to prevent private benefit extraction
by actively monitoring the actions of the first blockholder. If she does, we assume lost re-
sources are fully recovered with probability p. For the moment, we assume that monitoring
can be done without cost. If monitoring costs are included in the model, optimal monitoring
activity decreases and private benefit extraction increases.
The values of blocks 1 and 2 are given by
V1 = (1− p)(α1φsI + sI − c1(s, k, ·)I) + p(α1φnsI − c1(s, k, ·)I)
≈ (1− p)(α1(φns − δs)I + sI − c1(s, k, ·)I) + p(α1φnsI − c1(s, k, ·)I)
≈ (α1(φns − qδs) + qs− c1(s, k, ·))I, (1)
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and
V2 ≈ α2(φns − qδs)I, (2)
where q = 1− p, and where φs and φns denote equity as a fraction of total company value in
the stealing and non-stealing cases, respectively. The terms (α1φsI + sI − c1(s, k, ·)I) and
(α1φnsI − c1(s, k, ·)I) in (1) represents the payoffs when lost resources are not, respectively
are fully recovered. The second line of (1) uses the contingent claims setting of Merton
(1974), writing the change in company value as the fraction diverted, s, times the equity
delta, δ. We can interpret the term preceding I in the last line of (1) as the effective share
owned by the blockholder. We assume that the blockholder tries to maximize this effective
share, possibly at the expense of other stakeholders.
Total firm value equals
VFirm = q(1− s)I + pI. (3)
A larger s thus leads to a lower firm value. Solving the first order condition of V1 with
respect to s, we obtain
c1s(s, k, ·) = (1− δα1)q. (4)
Differentiating this once more with respect to α, k, and p, we get
ds∗
dα1
= − (1− p)δ
c1ss(s∗, k, ·) < 0, (5)
ds∗
dk
= −c1ks(s
∗, k, ·)
c1ss(s∗, k, ·) < 0, (6)
ds∗
dp
= − (1− δα1)
c1ss(s∗, k, ·) < 0. (7)
Consider initially the case of one blockholder who, by definition, is not monitored (p =
0). The first derivative (5) reveals that a higher residual claim α1 makes the blockholder
internalize more of the value diversion effects, thus lowering his incentives to engage in value
diversion. The second inequality (6) states that an improvement in shareholder rights k
leads to less value diversion due to better opportunities for minority shareholders to monitor
and discipline blockholders. Finally, (7) indicates that by allowing for a second monitoring
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blockholder and setting p > 0, a higher probability of detection lowers the optimal level of
value diversion.
In a setting with two blockholders, we can distinguish three different cases: (i) block-
holders collude to divert resources, thereby maximizing their combined effective ownership
stake; (ii) one blockholder diverts, while the other tries to prevent this through monitoring;
(iii) both blockholders divert independently. Maury and Pajuste (2004, 2005) restrict their
attention to cases (i) and (ii). Though collusion is an option, it may be hard to achieve in
practice as much more coordination is needed than for example for case (iii). Moreover, a
priori it is not clear why it would be economically uninteresting for blockholders to divert re-
sources independently, and to reciprocally tolerate resource diversion by other blockholders.
We argue therefore that it is also interesting to investigate alternative (iii) and to account
for it in empirical work on the relation between ownership structure and value. In case (iii),
the objective function for blockholder 1 equals
V Ind1 = (α1(φns − δ(s1 + s2)) + s1 − c1(s1, k, ·))I, (8)
where Ind denotes independent diversion. Interchanging subscripts 1 and 2 we have a similar
expression for blockholder 2. Both equations can be solved jointly to obtain the optimal levels
of diversion for both blockholders.
For the collusion case, we denote the optimal level of (colluded) diversion as sc. The
collusion case needs one additional key parameter: the fraction of the diversion benefits
accruing to blockholder 1, denoted as λ1. The remaining fraction of diversion benefits,
denoted as 1 − λ1, accrues to blockholder 2. It is clear that λ1 is a key determinant of the
sustainability (and possible dominance) of a collusion outcome. If λ1 is too low, blockholder
1 is better off by stealing independently or by taking the risk of being monitored. Vice versa,
if λ1 is too large, blockholder 2 may be better off by monitoring or by stealing independently.
1
We can formulate the conditions that have to be satisfied for a collusion outcome to be
sustainable, compare Maury and Pajuste (2004). The conditions effectively pin down the
1For simplicity, we assume that only blockholder 2 possibly engages in monitoring. The example can
easily be extended to also consider the case where blockholder 1 monitors blockholder 2.
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participation constraints for the individual blockholders to engage in collusion rather than
in monitoring or in independent diversion. The equations themselves, however, add little
insight: within the current stylized set-up of our model the dominating outcome (collusion,
monitoring, independent stealing) depends very much on the precise specification of cost
functions, parameters, etc.
To fix ideas, we consider a concrete example with quadratic cost functions ci(s, ·) = θis2.
We assume that θi > 0 changes with the size of the blockholding αi. In particular, we assume
that larger blocks are more efficient in resource diversion, ∂θi/∂αi < 0. As in Maury and
Pajuste (2004), we can show that for a particular choice of the fraction λ1 of diversion benefits
accruing to blockholder 1, the collusion outcome dominates the monitoring outcome for both
blockholders 1 and 2. We then only need to compare the combined effective ownership stake
of the two blockholders under the collusion outcome with the independent stealing outcome.
Even in the current simple set-up with quadratic cost functions, we find many where the
combined effective ownership under independent stealing exceeds the combined collusion
outcome. To be specific, consider the case φns = 0.30 and δ = 0.75, α1 = 0.25 and α2 = 0.2,
and θ1 = 11 and θ2 = 13. In the collusion case θc = 8.5. With these parameter values we
obtain the left-hand panel in Figure 1.
The left-hand panel in Figure 1 presents the marginal cost curves for our two blockholders
under the assumption of quadratic cost functions. The optimal diversion level s lies at the
point where the marginal cost θisi reaches the level 1− δαi. Using our current assumptions,
the two lines labeled B and A give the marginal cost curves for blockholder 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Given the current setting the optimal aggregate diverted share under independent
stealing (7.0%) is larger than under collusion (3.9%). Moreover, the combined effective own-
ership stake in the independent stealing case of 15.2 percent dominates the coalition outcome
of 14.8 percent. In such cases, one of the blockholders must be made worse off by colluding,
thus making the collusion unsustainable.
If independent stealing is optimal, blockholder dispersion may directly impact firm value.
To study the impact of blockholder dispersion, assume that the combined fraction of stock
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held by both blockholders (α1+α2) is kept fixed, while the difference between the block sizes
(α1−α2) is increased, where α1 > α2. This exercise makes blockholder 1 more dominant with
respect to blockholder 2, thus leading to a more concentrated ownership structure and less
blockholder dispersion. Under our current assumption of more efficient stealing for larger
blocks, the marginal cost curve for blockholder 1 tilts down, while that for blockholder 2 tilts
up. At the same time, the critical cost level 1− δα1 for blockholder 1 shifts down, whereas
that for blockholder 2 shifts up. By connecting the points of intersection, we obtain a locus
characterizing the optimal levels of diversion under independent stealing for different block
sizes αi.
The two lines labeled B’ and A’ give the marginal cost curves for blockholder 1 and 2
when α1 is raised to 0.3 whilst α1 decreases to 0.15. In this case the combined effective
ownership stake in the independent stealing case turns out to be unchanged at 15.2 percent,
and still dominates the coalition outcome of 14.8 percent. However, the optimal aggregate
diverted share under independent stealing (6.7%) is lower than the one obtained in the less
concentrated setting (7.0%).
In general, as long as the optimal diversion level (s) is a convex function of the critical
cost level, less blockholder dispersion leads to a higher firm value. In such cases, the decrease
in optimal stealing by blockholder 2 more than offsets the increased stealing by blockholder
1. We emphasize that the converse may hold for other parameter values or cost structures.
The actual direction of the effect of blockholder dispersion on value in a real life setting can
only be answered empirically. This is done in the next sections.
3 Data
We combine data from several sources. Standard & Poor’s issuer ratings are obtained from
the June 2005 Standard & Poor’s CREDITPRO 7.0 database. Firm-specific data are taken
from COMPUSTAT, and daily stock data are obtained from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). To obtain data on governance provisions and stock ownership, we
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use additional data sources by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), described
further below. In the end, matching the different data sources leaves us with between 3,315
and 3,654 firm year observations, depending on whether we use corporate credit ratings or
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Table 1 provides the variable descriptions.
To proxy for shareholder rights we use the indicators on the presence or absence of
individual governance provisions as constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Their
GIM index is based on publications by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).
GIM is constructed using all 22 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level
rules, plus possible coverage under six state takeover laws, as present in the IRRC data.
The GIM index is raised by 1 point if either a provision is present that compromises on
shareholder rights, or a provision is not present that strengthens shareholder rights. The
data are available for July 1995, February 1998, November 1999, and January 2002. To
obtain values in between reporting dates we interpolate, assuming provisions do not change
until the IRRC publishes new data.
The most widely used source for ownership data is the Compact Disclosure (CD) database
of Standard and Poor’s. Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006) show that
available data on blockholding from the CD database has many mistakes and biases such
as double counting. Their cleaned database focuses on companies covered by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and covers the period 1996-2001.2
Blockholders are shareholders owning 5% or more of a company’s stock. Such blockhold-
ers are required to file their ownership stake at the SEC. The CD database allows us to
distinguish between different types of shareholders: (1) Outside blockholders; (2) Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs); (3) Officers; (4) Directors; and (5) Affiliated entities. Cat-
egory 1 includes all blockholders that are not part of one of the other categories. Category
2 represents the total number of shares held by ESOPs and, by definition, does not include
employee shares held through non-ESOP retirement plans. Category 3 includes officers, even
2The blockholder dataset excludes companies with multiple classes of stock. This immediately implies
that a distinction between voting and cash flow rights becomes less relevant.
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when they are also directors. Category 4 refers to non-officer directors. Finally, category 5
represents any blockholder (e.g., an individual, company or trust) whose voting outcome is
partially influenced, but not completely controlled, by an officer or director of the company.
Categories 2 to 5 will be referred to as inside blockholders. The CD database gives type as
well as percentages of shares held by individual blockholders.
Averaging over years, more than 80 percent of the companies within our sample has at
least one blockholder. Moreover, 75 percent actually has at least one outside blockholder,
and this fraction gradually increases over time.3 If we look at the percentage of shares held by
different blockholder types, we observe that affiliated shareholdings per firm can be relatively
large, especially when we compare this to other inside blockholders. Most companies in our
sample either have one or no inside blockholder, possibly complemented by some outside
blockholding. By contrast, outside blockholders are often paired by one or more outsiders.
This is reflected in the average number of outside blockholders per firm, ranging from 2.1 to
2.4 over the years.
Table 2 reports the distribution of blockholder types using all observations. In the first
line of the table we see that for most companies outside blockholders are the most prevalent.
The lower part of the table gives an overview of successor types, conditioned on the largest
blockholder type. For example, the last column shows that, given that the largest blockholder
is an outsider, 22.9% of the observations have no other blockholder, 9.4% have a second
largest inside blockholder, and 67.7% have a second largest outside blockholder. Conditioning
on the same event reveals that, when there is a third blockholder, it is most likely an outsider
as well, indicated by the 42.2%.
Our primary focus in this paper is on the dispersion of blockholdings. One way to measure
this is to consider the number of blockholders per company. This, however, discards the effect
of the shareholding distribution itself. For example, a total ownership stake of 40% held by
two blockholders of equal size (20%-20%) can have very different implications than a 35%-
3Cremers, Nair and Wei (2007) note that around 63 percent of the companies within their dataset,
stretching from 1991 to 1997, have at least one institutional blockholder.
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5% distribution. The latter resembles much more a case with a single dominant blockholder
than one with multiple (equally powerful) blockholders.
To also account for the block sizes held by different blockholders, we use the Herfindahl
index. This index is a standard summary statistic of industry concentration in the literature
on industrial organization, see for example Tirole (2003, Ch. 5). We use a scaled version of
the index defined as
Herfindahl =
[(%Block1) + (%Block2) + . . .+ (%Block5)]2
[(%Block1)2 + (%Block2)2 + . . .+ (%Block5)2]
. (9)
Thus, if there is just 1 blockholder, Herfindahl = 1. If there are 5 blockholders with equal
shareholdings, Herfindahl = 5. If by contrast one out of 5 blockholder holds, for example,
30% of the company’s shares, while the others hold 5% each, Herfindahl = 2.5, which is
considerably smaller than 5.
We also experimented with alternative concentration measures, including logarithmic
transformations and measures based on differences in block sizes, but our results appeared
to be robust. We therefore omit them from the presentation.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Firm Value: Tobin’s Q
Our sample is an unbalanced panel. To determine the effect of ownership structure and
shareholder rights on Tobin’s Q, we use a random effects specification, where we include time
dummies as well as industry dummies based on the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes.
Besides control variables, the first model in Table 3 includes both GIM as a measure
of shareholder rights as well as the ownership stakes held by different blockholder types.
The control variables enter with their expected sign, though the coefficients on age, capital
intensity and capital expenditure lack statistical significance. In particular, we would expect
higher profitability, Delaware incorporation, and a higher sensitivity to general market move-
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ments to be positively related to Tobin’s Q. Firm age, size, leverage and asset tangibility
tend to be negatively related to Q. Though the coefficient is negative, insignificance of firm
age may be due to the fact that firm maturity is already captured by the size variable. A
relatively large debt burden can be negatively (e.g., riskiness, debt overhang) or positively
(e.g., disciplining role) related to firm value. In accordance with the results by Demsetz and
Villalonga (2001) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) we obtain a significant negative relation
between Tobin’s Q and leverage. The effect of capital intensity is negative, but insignifi-
cant. Firms with high asset tangibility presumably have a lower proportion of intangible
assets (goodwill, human capital), which has a negative impact on Q. One can argue that
capital expenditure may be negatively related to Q (in line with the previous reasoning).
Conversely, it could as well be an important indication of investment opportunities (Daines
(2001)), leading to a positive impact on Q. Empirically, the coefficient for capital expendi-
ture is insignificant. The coefficient on the governance index GIM is negative and significant.
Compromising on shareholder rights has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q, which is in line
with the result of Gompers et al. (2003).
We now turn to the effect of block ownership and blockholder dispersion. We distinguish
between companies with different total size of blockholder ownership. We construct three
brackets: small (strictly less than 10% combined ownership; 483 cases), medium (from 10%
up to 25%; 1,262 cases), and large (more than 25%; 1,374 cases) combined block ownership
stakes. As the data only has information of blockholders with stakes of at least 5%, it is clear
that the first bracket only contains cases with a single blockholder. The other two brackets
allow us to differentiate between the impact of blockholder dispersion for small and large
combined ownership stakes.
The first model in Table 3 confirms the broad negative relation between the percentage
of shares held by blockholders and Tobin’s Q. Dummy variables distinguishing whether
blockholders of a particular type are present, all turn out to be insignificant.
If we include in our second model specification the interaction between ownership size and
dispersion, some interesting results appear. As explained earlier, the Herfindahl index for the
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smallest block ownership bracket always equals one. As a result, no interaction term can be
incorporated for the smallest bracket. As Table 3 indicates, the other two interaction terms
turn out to be highly significant. In particular, the impact of the size of combined ownership
stakes for the largest two brackets more than halves. For the second bracket, the coefficient
becomes insignificant, and even changes sign, whereas the coefficient for the highest bracket is
only significant at the 10% level. By contrast, the interaction terms with the Herfindahl index
are both significant at the 1% level. This suggest that lower blockholder concentration would
be relatively more detrimental in terms of firm value. Though not reported, this tendency
is confirmed if we look at differences between stakes held by different blockholders.4 The
latter measure decreases when blockholder concentration gets lower. We indeed find positive
significant coefficients when we use this alternative measure.
The control coefficients in our Model (2) remain largely unaffected. The only noteworthy
change is that the dummy for director blockownership now becomes significant at the 10%
level. Interestingly, the coefficient is positive, indicating that a director owning a large stake
of the company is good for value. This is more in line with an incentive based explanation
than with the value diversion explanation.
To investigate the robustness of our findings, we also specify Model (3). Here we perform
a similar analysis as before, while concentrating on outside blockholders only. We replace
the total percentage of shares held by all blockholders by the total percentage of shares
held by outside blockholders. Similarly, the concentration measures now focus exclusively
on the five largest outside blockholders. The results of the model specifications (3) and
(4) are in line with our previous findings in models (1) and (2). Most coefficients remain
stable. In particular, we can conclude that if we focus on external blockholder dispersion,
such dispersion is bad for firm value.
As a final check, we investigate whether the results are affected due to an interaction
between the presence of blockholders and shareholder rights. Blockholdings may be less
4In particular, [(%Block1−%Block2)2 + (%Block2−%Block3)2 + . . .+ (%Block5−%Block4)]2 scaled
by the sum of the equity stakes squared.
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detrimental for value if accompanied with sufficiently well-developed shareholder rights. In
line with LaPorta et al. (2002), if shareholder rights are good, minority shareholders can dis-
cipline blockholders more. To distinguish between companies with good and bad shareholder
rights, we specify a final model (5) in which we interact combined shareholder ownership
with a dummy indicating whether the GIM index of the company was 10 or lower. The GIM
index of 10 is roughly the sample median. Companies with a small GIM index have good
shareholder rights.
The empirical findings in model (5) indicate that the interaction terms with GIM turn
out to be significant at the 10% and 5% level for the first two brackets, respectively. The
coefficients are positive, indicating that good shareholder rights combined with higher block
ownerhip is good for value. This is in line with LaPorta et al. (2002). Interestingly, however,
these additional terms leave the effect of dispersion in block ownership unaffected.
4.2 Blockholder dispersion and debt: corporate credit ratings
To determine whether and to what extent the firm’s ownership structure and shareholder
rights affect debt holders we look in the following at the impact of these governance elements
on corporate ratings as well.
In particular, ownership structure and shareholder rights represent 2 out of 4 dimensions
of the corporarate governance score (CGS) of Standard and Poor’s (2002). CGSs are de-
veloped to assess corporate governance practices and policies, and the extent to which they
serve the interests of the company’s financial stakeholders. Standard & Poor’s (2005) states
that though the CGS is geared towards the equity investor’s perspective, governance issues
are regularly examined as part of the credit rating methodology.
Focusing on corporate credit ratings instead of Tobin’s Q we change the modelling frame-
work to an ordered logit to account for the discrete nature of credit ratings. Similar to our
analysis for Tobin’s Q, we account for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity by using a
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random effects specification.5
Table 4 shows that the control variables enter with their expected sign throughout all
model specifications (1) to (5). In particular, higher (market) leverage, negative earnings, the
presence of subordinated debt as well as a higher exposure to (systematic) risk as captured
by beta decreases a company’s credit rating. On the other hand, a larger size, high past
profitability and a higher interest coverage ratio increases a company’s debt rating. As
expected, the marginal impact of a higher interest coverage ratio decreases. Whilst the
coefficient on the first bracket shows the largest positive impact, the sign of the coefficient
related to the last bracket actually turns out to be small and insignificant.
The coefficient on current profitability has the opposite sign of what we expect. How-
ever, including it as a stand-alone variable yields a statistically significant positive impact.
The negative coefficient is probably caused by the inclusion of retained earnings, which has
a strong and highly significant positive impact on ratings. Dsub gives an indication of the
quality of a company’s debt structure. For example, existing debt holders may have forced
(e.g., via covenants) the company to issue subordinated debt in the past to prevent wealth
redistributions with a possibly negative impact. Moreover, the mere existence of subordi-
nated debt may make the issuance of claims that have a higher priority in case of default
more difficult. In general, a company without subordinated debt might thus have better
refinancing possibilities, which could explain the negative coefficient obtained.
Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) the positive coefficient on GIM reveals that
a higher governance index is associated with higher ratings. It seems that rating agencies
are foremostly concerned about shifts in balance of power towards shareholders. Given the
positive coefficients, we conclude that compromising on shareholder rights has a positive
5We maximize the loglikelihood
∑
i
ln
∞∫
−∞
[
ΠTit=1
{
F (γyit − xTitβ − σuui)− F (γyit−1 − xTitβ − σuui)
}ci,t]
f(ui)dui
where m  {1, 2, . . . ,M}, γ0 = −∞ and γM =∞, and ci,t equals 1 if firm i is in the sample in period t. We
assume the individual effects ui are normally distributed.
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impact on corporate credit ratings.
Model (1) shows that a larger total stake of blockholder ownersip is without exception
negatively related to debt ratings. The dummy variables distinguishing between different
blockholder types are negative and significant with respect to outside and affiliated block-
holders. In contrast, the presence of ESOPs and directors is positively related to ratings,
though this effect is insignificant.
Consistent with the Tobin’s Q regressions of Table 3, model (2) in Table 4 shows that less
blockholder concentration (i.e., a higher value of the Herfindahl index) is negatively related
to credit ratings. The effect is there for both medium and high brackets of blockholdings,
but only significant for companies with the largest fractions of blockholder ownership.
As with the analysis of Tobin’s Q, we also check the robustness of our result for credit
ratings by focusing on outside blockholdings. Model (3) confirms the relatively strong nega-
tive association between outside blockholdings and ratings. The interaction terms of model
(4) reveals that at least part of this negative association can be ascribed to blockholder
concentration. The magnitude and statistical significance of the medium and large bracket
of aggregated blockholdings decreases.
Looking alternatively at differences between blockholder sizes6 compromises on statistical
significance (not reported). However, coefficients point consistently in the same direction.
Less blockholder concentration is relatively more detrimental to credit ratings. The effect of
shareholder rights on ratings, however, differs from its effect on Tobin’s Q. Whereas GIM is
negatively related to Q, it is positively related to credit ratings. This points to a potential
conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders.
In model (5) we include the interaction terms between shareholder rights and blockholder
presence. Similar to the GIM index itself, the effects of the interaction terms on ratings are
opposite from those of Tobin’s Q. Good shareholder rights aggravate the negative effect
of large blockholders on credit ratings. The coefficient on GIM itself hardly changes and
remains significant. Complementarity of shareholder control and shareholder rights is in
6See footnote 4.
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line with Cremers et al. (2007). They construct an anti-takeover index (ATI) out of four
rather than 22 governance provisions that together make up GIM, to focus on the ability of
management to obstruct or delay the direct interference by shareholders. The authors stress
the importance of interaction between the magnitude of ATI and the presence of institutional
blockholders, noting their results are similar when ATI is replaced by GIM.
.
Once again, the inclusion of shareholder interaction leaves the coefficients of blockholder
dispersion rather unchanged. The significance of blockholder dispersion for the middle
bracket drops below 10%, but blockholder dispersion for the largest bracket remains sig-
nificant and of similar size as for the other models. We therefore conclude that the negative
impact of blockholder dispersion on perceived debt quality is robust.
5 Conclusion
This paper determines the effect of a firm’s ownership structure, in particular the dispersion
in blockholdings, on firms’ stock and debt valuation. We obtain a consistently negative
relation between blockholder dispersion and Tobin’s Q. The results are robust to a variety
of model specifications, including controlling for shareholder rights. The results also remain
qualitatively robust if we consider the impact of blockholder dispersion and shareholder
rights on perceived debt quality using corporate credit ratings as our dependent variable.
Blockholdings are negatively related to credit ratings, with a relatively larger negative impact
when block dispersion is higher.
Shareholder rights in our analysis are positively related to Q, but negatively to ratings.
This suggests that a shift in balance of power towards shareholders is considered as a negative
signal by credit rating agencies. Overall, we find slight evidence of an interaction effects
between blockholder presence and shareholder rights.
A negative impact of blockholder presence suggests there may be room for private benefits
of control, possibly at the expense of other stakeholders. Though there may be competing
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explanations, our theoretical and empirical results show that less blockholder concentration
might aggravate this problem in two ways. First, the smaller ownership stake of blockholders
in control enhances their failure to internalize negative externalities. This negative effect
may be stronger than the opposite positive effect of monitoring by blockholders that are
not in control. Secondly, even if blockholders are aware of their mutual incentives to divert
resources, they might have no economic incentive to obstruct each others attempt to extract
private benefits. This may make blockholders better off compared to the monitoring or
collusion case, while the combined negative impact on firm value may be larger.
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Table 1: Data source description
To merge the different data sets we use the following time conventions. The time period considered are the calendar years
stretching from 1996 to 2001. In each specific year we take the end of the year as our point of reference. Firm specific variables
constructed using COMPUSTAT data are always related to the last closed fiscal year. Variables constructed out of CRSP data
are always up to date. That is, market values of equity are calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the stock
price at the end of the year. Betas are estimated using daily data from the current calendar year, where we require at least
200 return observations. In line with Gompers et al. (2003), we assume governance provisions do not change until the IRRC
publishes new data. We use the blockholding data reported in the specific calendar year considered.
Variable Description Source or
Compustat Number
Tobin’s Q Market Value/Book Value: (bv(assets) - bv(common stock) - deferred taxes +
mv(CRSP))/bv(assets).
(6-60-74+
mv(CRSP))/6
ROA Return on Assets: (Income Before Extraordinary Items)/Total Assets. 18/6
Lev Leverage: Total Debt / Total Assets. (9+34)/6
CapInt Asset Tangibility : (Gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE))/Total Assets. 7/6
Size Size: log(Total Assets). ln(6)
Delaware Delaware Incorporated: Equal to one if the company is incorporated in Delaware. Incorporation Code
CapExp Capital Expenditure: (Capital Expenditure on Property Plant and Equipment)/Total As-
sets.
30/6
Age Age: log(Months since first listing CRSP). CRSP
β Beta: Beta coefficients are obtained by regressing daily company stock returns from the
current calendar year on market returns (i.e., the Wilshire5000), where we require at least
200 return observations. To adjust for nonsynchronous trading effects we use the method
suggested by Dimson (1979), adding one leading and one lagging value of the market
return as explanatory variables. Though it does not affect results, in line with Blume et
al. (1998), each year we scale betas by their cross-sectional mean.
CRSP
Rating S&P CREDITPRO 7.0
(June 2005 version)
Fin/Utility Fin/Utility: 1 if the firm is a financial institution (1 digit SIC code 6) or a utility (2 digit
SIC code 49).
SIC code
Lev Leverage (Market): log(Total Debt / mv(CRSP)). (9+34)/CRSP
loss(t-1,t) Losses: Equal to 1 if net income before extraordinary items < 0 in the previous two fiscal
years.
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Dsub Subordinated Debt: 1 if the firm has subordinated debt. 80
margin Operating Margin: (Operating Income Before Depreciation) / Sales-net. 13/12
ret Retained Earnings: Retained Earnings / Total Asset. 36/6
β Beta: See description above. CRSP
Size Size: log(Total Assets). ln(6)
covj Interest Coverage: In line with Blume et al. (1998), as of skewness, we adjust the way inter-
est coverage enters the model. For a negative value is not meaningful, we first set negative
values to zero and truncate the maximum value to 100. Subsequently we use 4 brackets,
with boundaries at coverage ratio’s 5, 10 and 20, such that nonlinearities can be picked
up by the model. If x denotes the interest coverage ratio, we have cov1=median(0, x, 5),
cov2=median(0, x − 5, 5), cov3=median(0, x − 10, 10), cov4=median(0, x − 20, 80). For
example, if x = 40, cov1=5, cov2=5, cov3=10, cov4=10.
(15+178)/15
Governance variables Online Source*
GIM Governance index: Uses 22 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level rules,
plus possible coverage under 6 state takeover laws, see Gompers et al. (2003).
Affiliated Affiliated Entities: Blockholder (e.g., an individual, company or trust) whose voting out-
come is partially influenced, but not completely controlled, by an officer or director of the
company.
ESOP Employee Share Ownership Plans: Blockholding by Employee Share Ownership Plans.
Does not include employee shares held through non-ESOP retirement plans (e.g., non-
ESOP 401(k) plans).
Director Director: Non-officer directors.
Officer Officer: Officers, even when they are are also directors.
Outsider Outside blockholders: Blockholders that are not part of one of the other categories.
Herfindahl Herfindahl Index (Scaled): Herfindahl = [(%Block1) +(%Block2)+ . . . +
(%Block5)]2/[(%Block1)2 +(%Block2)2+ . . .+ (%Block5)2].
*The governance variables can be obtained from Andrew Metrick’s homepage at the Yale School of Management
(http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859).
Table 2: Distribution of Blockholder Types
Notes: All statistics relate to the Tobin’s Q sample of 3,654 firm-year observations. The rat-
ing sample yields qualitatively similar results. The upper part of the table shows the largest
blockholder type distribution, scaled by the total number of observations. The lower part of the
table gives an overview of successors, conditioned on largest blockholder type. Affiliated entities,
ESOPs, Directors and Officers are merged into one insider category.
Largest Blockholder
Affiliated ESOP Director Officer Outsider
% % % % %
Coverage 7.0 6.4 3.6 5.8 62.5
Successors
Second None 22.2 39.7 34.1 25.5 22.9
Insider 20.6 8.5 22.0 20.3 9.4
Outsider 57.2 51.7 43.9 54.2 67.7
Third None 52.5 71.4 56.1 48.6 52.2
Insider 10.9 4.3 6.8 9.0 5.5
Outsider 36.6 24.4 37.1 42.5 42.3
Fourth None 77.4 87.2 73.5 69.8 75.2
Insider 7.4 1.3 10.6 4.2 2.8
Outsider 15.2 11.5 15.9 25.9 22.0
Fifth None 92.6 94.0 87.1 89.2 88.9
Insider 1.6 0.9 4.5 1.4 1.1
Outsider 5.8 5.1 8.3 9.4 10.1
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q
Notes: This table presents random effect unbalanced panel regressions of Tobin’s Q on governance and control variables for 828
U.S. companies over the period 1996-2001, resulting in a total of 3,654 firm-year observations. To reduce the weight of outliers,
Tobin’s Q is capped at the 5 and 95 percentiles. The control variables are capped at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. The control
variables used are: Return on Assets (ROA), Leverage (Lev), Capital Intensity (CapInt), Firm Size (Size), a dummy equal to one
if the company is incorporated in Delaware (Delaware), Capital Expenditure (CapExp), Firm Age (Age) and Market Beta (β),
industry dummies based on 2 digit SIC codes (not reported), and time dummies (not reported). GIM denotes the governance
index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003), consisting of 24 provisions, which adds 1 point if a provisions compromises on
shareholder rights (GIM). The remaining variables refer to a firm’s ownership structure, in terms of blockholding. Blockholders
are shareholders owning 5 percent or more of a firm’s stock. Ownership variables enter as 0-1 indicators. The blockholder
types considered are: Affiliated entities (Affiliated), Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP), non-officer directors (Director),
officers, even when they are also directors (Officer) and outside blockholders (Outsider). %Small, %Medium and %Large denote
the total percentage of shares held by blockholders subdivided within three brackets, with boundaries at the 5, 10 and 25
percent level, respectively. The Herfindahl variable measures ownership concentration, considering the (potentially) 5 largest
blockholders. Herfindahl = [(%Block1) +(%Block2)+ . . . + (%Block5)]2/[(%Block1)2 +(%Block2)2 +. . .+ (%Block5)2]. The
left-hand panel relates to all blockholders. The right-hand panel considers outside blockholders only. σv and σu denote the
estimated between-groups and within-groups variance, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. a,b,c denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
All Blocks Outsiders
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C 2.20 (0.22)a 2.18 (0.22)a 2.18 (0.22)a 2.18 (0.22)a 2.07 (0.22)a
ROA 2.30 (0.16)a 2.30 (0.16)a 2.27 (0.16)a 2.29 (0.16)a 2.29 (0.16)a
Lev -0.68 (0.10)a -0.67 (0.10)a -0.68 (0.10)a -0.68 (0.10)a -0.68 (0.10)a
CapInt -0.07 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07)
Size -0.06 (0.02)a -0.06 (0.02)a -0.06 (0.02)a -0.06 (0.02)a -0.06 (0.02)a
Delaware 0.11 (0.05)a 0.11 (0.05)b 0.12 (0.05)a 0.11 (0.05)a 0.11 (0.05)a
CapExp 0.31 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32) 0.31 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32)
Age -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03)
β 0.14 (0.02)a 0.15 (0.02)a 0.14 (0.02)a 0.14 (0.02)a 0.14 (0.02)a
GIM -0.02 (0.01)a -0.02 (0.01)a -0.02 (0.01)a -0.02 (0.01)a -0.01 (0.01)c
Affiliated 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05)
ESOP -0.06 (0.05) -0.04 (0.05) -0.10 (0.05)b -0.10 (0.05)b -0.10 (0.05)b
Director 0.07 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06)c 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06)
Officer -0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05) -0.06 (0.05)
Outsider -0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Blockholding aggregated
%Small -1.39 (0.60)a -2.19 (0.64)a -1.29 (0.45)a -1.50 (0.46)a -2.07 (0.63)a
%Medium -0.42 (0.23)b 0.19 (0.42) -0.61 (0.18)a 0.14 (0.44) -0.11 (0.46)
%Large -0.46 (0.12)a -0.23 (0.16)c -0.54 (0.10)a -0.27 (0.18)c -0.26 (0.19)c
Herfindahl index
Herfindahl*Medium -0.09 (0.03)a -0.07 (0.03)b -0.07 (0.03)b
Herfindahl*Large -0.05 (0.02)a -0.04 (0.02)b -0.04 (0.02)b
High shareholder rights
(GIM ≤ 10)*Small 0.08 (0.06)c
(GIM ≤ 10)*Medium 0.10 (0.05)b
(GIM ≤ 10)*Large 0.03 (0.06)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
n 3,654 3,654 3,654 3,654 3,654
firms 828 828 828 828 828
σv 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31
σu 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Corporate Credit Ratings
Notes: This table presents random effect unbalanced panel regressions of Standard and Poor’s corporate credit ratings on
governance and control variables for 826 U.S. companies over the period 1996-2001. The control variables used are: the dummy
Fin/Utility equal to one if the company is a financial institution (one digit SIC code 6) or a utility (two digit SIC code 49),
Market Leverage (Lev), a dummy equal to one if net income before extraordinary items is negative in the previous two fiscal
years (losst-1,t), a dummy equal to one if the firm has subordinated debt (Dsub), interest coverage (covj), Operating Margin
(margin), Retained Earnings (ret), Market Beta (β), Firm Size (Size), and time dummies (not shown). Control variables are
capped at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles. GIM denotes the governance index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003), consisting of
24 provisions, which adds 1 point if a provisions compromises on shareholder rights (GIM). The remaining variables refer to a
firm’s ownership structure, see Table 3. The left-hand panel relates to all blockholders. The right-hand panel considers outside
blockholders only. σv denotes the estimated standard deviation of the random effect.) McFadden’s LR index (Pseudo-R2)
equals 1 − ln(L)/ ln(L0), where L0 denotes the likelihood statistic when, apart from a constant, no explanatory variables are
included. Standard errors are in parentheses. a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
All Blocks Outsiders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fin/Utility 4.23 (0.42)a 4.38 (0.63)a 4.29 (0.42)a 5.24 (0.61)a 4.55 (0.47)a
Lev -0.98 (0.08)a -0.99 (0.08)a -0.98 (0.08)a -1.01 (0.08)a -0.99 (0.08)a
loss(t-1,t) -1.04 (0.28)a -1.09 (0.28)a -1.03 (0.28)a -1.02 (0.29)a -0.99 (0.28)a
Dsub -0.51 (0.22)b -0.62 (0.22)a -0.50 (0.22)b -0.69 (0.24)a -0.66 (0.22)a
cov1 0.31 (0.06)a 0.31 (0.06)a 0.30 (0.06)a 0.29 (0.06)a 0.32 (0.06)a
cov2 0.14 (0.04)a 0.14 (0.04)a 0.14 (0.04)a 0.15 (0.04)a 0.12 (0.05)a
cov3 0.07 (0.03)a 0.07 (0.03)a 0.07 (0.03)a 0.07 (0.03)b 0.07 (0.03)a
cov4 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
margin -1.42 (0.72)b -1.49 (0.76)b -1.43 (0.70)b -1.45 (0.73)b -1.34 (0.69)b
ret 5.73 (0.51)a 5.76 (0.52)a 5.78 (0.51)a 5.89 (0.48)a 5.72 (0.52)a
β -0.43 (0.09)a -0.45 (0.09)a -0.43 (0.09)a -0.41 (0.09)a -0.43 (0.09)a
Size 2.62 (0.13)a 2.54 (0.13)a 2.64 (0.13)a 2.59 (0.14)a 2.57 (0.12)a
GIM 0.09 (0.04)b 0.13 (0.05)a 0.09 (0.04)b 0.16 (0.05)a 0.11 (0.05)b
Affiliated -0.44 (0.27)c -0.34 (0.25)c -0.67 (0.27)a -0.48 (0.29)b -0.63 (0.28)b
ESOP 0.10 (0.23) 0.04 (0.25) -0.07 (0.23) -0.09 (0.23) -0.14 (0.24)
Director 0.16 (0.27) 0.12 (0.27) -0.01 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) -0.10 (0.26)
Officer -0.18 (0.28) -0.16 (0.28) -0.36 (0.28)c -0.12 (0.28) -0.40 (0.27)c
Outsider -0.32 (0.16)b -0.27 (0.17)c
Blockholding aggregated
%Small -4.84 (2.61)b -5.60 (2.73)b -7.01 (1.87)a -7.49 (1.91)a -5.81 (2.62)b
%Medium -2.85 (1.05)a -3.31 (1.88)b -3.35 (0.77)a -2.14 (1.89) -1.20 (1.94)
%Large -2.04 (0.61)a -0.97 (0.75)c -2.33 (0.49)a -0.98 (0.85) -0.45 (0.89)
Herfindahl index
Herfindahl*Medium -0.03 (0.15) -0.14 (0.11)c -0.14 (0.14)
Herfindahl*Large -0.14 (0.08)b -0.16 (0.09)b -0.19 (0.09)b
High shareholder rights
(GIM ≤ 10)*Small -0.29 (0.24)
(GIM ≤ 10)*Medium -0.31 (0.21)c
(GIM ≤ 10)*Large -0.23 (0.24)
σu 6.09 (0.18)a 6.11 (0.21)a 6.08 (0.18)a 6.14 (0.29)a 6.39 (0.20)a
LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
n 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,315 3,315
firms 826 826 826 826 826
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Figure 1: Increased Dispersion of Blockholders and Firm Value
The solid lines A and B in the left-hand figure are the marginal cost curves 2θ · s for blockholder 2 (small)
and 1 (large), respectively. The right-hand figure gives the value of θ as a function of blocksize α. Larger
blocks in this example steal more efficiently. The lines A’ and B’ give the shifted marginal cost curves for
increased dispersion in block ownership, from α1 to α′1 > α1, and a decrease from α2 to α
′
2 < α2, keeping
α1 + α2 constant. The locus CC ′ characterizes the optimal stealing levels by intersecting the marginal cost
curves θα with marginal ‘benefit’ 1− δα for various values of α.
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